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There are two fundamental models to understanding the phenomenon of natural life. One is the
computational model, which is based on the symbolic thinking paradigm. The other is the biological
organism model. The common difﬁculty attributed to these paradigms is that their reductive tools allow
the phenomenological aspects of experience to remain hidden behind yes/no responses (behavioral
tests), or brain ‘pictures’ (neuroimaging). Hence, one of the problems regards how to overcome meth-
odological difﬁculties towards a non-reductive investigation of conscious experience. It is our aim in this
paper to show how cooperation between Eastern and Western traditions may shed light for a non-
reductive study of mind and life. This study focuses on the ﬁrst-person experience associated with
cognitive and mental events. We studied phenomenal data as a crucial fact for the domain of living
beings, which, we expect, can provide the ground for a subsequent third-person study. The intervention
with Jhana meditation, and its qualitative assessment, provided us with experiential proﬁles based upon
subjects' evaluations of their own conscious experiences. The overall results should move towards an
integrated or global perspective on mind where neither experience nor external mechanisms have the
ﬁnal word.
© 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd.Contents
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Albert Einstein on Buddhism (1930)
1. Introduction
Thousands of years ago, long before the dawn of science,
perceptive access to the world enabled human beings to conduct
their affairs. As Koffka (1935, p. 7) put it: “To primitive man each
thing says what it is and what he ought to do with it: a fruit says,
“Eat me”; water says “Drink me”; thunder says “Fear me””. Over
time, by encountering both veridical and erroneous cases in their
original world, human beings learned to distrust what things told
them, and henceforth developed a new system founded no longer
on particulars, but on universals. While the world of primitive man
directed his experiencedtelling him what was good, bad,
dangerous, healthy, or safedtoday the world of scientiﬁc man
guides human experience through the intellect, logic, and veriﬁed
data.
Throughout the ages, however, a challenging question in science
has remained, viz. why does physical sensory stimulation have to
be accompanied by subjective experience?Were this not the case a
neurobiological explanation would sufﬁce, and Beethoven
composing the Ninth Symphony, or G€odel working on his theorems1
could be explained by the stimulus-response schema. Subjective
phenomena,2 which constitute the very texture of our existence,
are difﬁcult to describe and have thus far been excluded from sci-
entiﬁc investigation. This is a very difﬁcult topic for experimental
research, particularly because modern Western science starts by
quantiﬁcation, and assumes that psychological experience can be
expressed in purely quantitative terms (Weber's law). Of course
scientists recognize that only because somethings escape quanti-
ﬁcation, it does not mean they are to be dismissed from science. On
the contrary, as His Holiness the Dalai Lama remarks,
“It seems that scientiﬁc research reaches deeper and deeper. But
it also means that more and more people, at least scientists, are
beginning to realize that the spiritual factor is important. I say
‘spiritual’ without meaning any particular religion or faith, just
simple warmhearted compassion, human affection, and
gentleness. It is as if such warmhearted people are a bit more
humble, a little bit more content… If we do not combine science
with these basic human values, then scientiﬁc knowledge may
sometimes create trouble, even disaster” (His Holiness the Dalai
Lama, cited in Varela, 1997, pp 4e5).
How, then, do we explain subjective phenomena in a non-
reductive metaphysics of the human mind? Psychology, neurosci-
ence, philosophy, and physics, among other areas, study the nature1 For a phenomenological account of Mathematics, see Hipolito (2015).
2 Conscious experiences such as: when an idea comes to mind; when a childhood
memory suddenly returns; when we enjoy a piece of music, or taste a good wine;
whenwe read a novel, or write a letter; or whenwe watch the sunset, or visit an art
gallery, and so on.of the subjective phenomenon. Their progressive specialization has
marked scientiﬁc progress both in Eastern and Western views,
experimental and theoretical. This specialization and separation
was necessary, but it has inevitably worked against the aim of an
integral science (Simeonov, 2010), i.e., a science that is plurally
constituted. Owing to this, we propose to look at a new perspective
within the study of the mind and subjective experience. This
perspective is based on the principle of interdependence between
the constituting disciplines, in a dialogue between Eastern and
Western traditions. In this paper, it is our aim to show empirically
how theoretical cooperation between these traditions may shed
light on a non-reductive understanding of life and mind.
A uniﬁed approach can be rigorously formulated to accommo-
date qualitative analysis and quantitative measurements. In our
study, we combined a psychological assessment with a molecular
measurement of protein proﬁles, with the aim of contributing to
the phenomenological investigation of subjective experience. This
is the ﬁrst in a series of papers in which we focus on the inter-
vention methodology adopted, viz. Buddhist meditative practice.
We begin the paper by introducing the hard problem of conscious-
ness, discussing the various answers it offers with regard to the
phenomenological investigation of subjective experience. We focus
in particular on the Western neurobiology of consciousness hy-
pothesis, and the life-mind continuity thesis. We expect the results
of our qualitative experiment (section 4) to show alignment with
the life-mind continuity thesis.1.1. The hard problem of consciousness
It is uncontroversial that consciousness is present when, for
example, a student attends a class, in a spectator's excitement at a
football game, when Galileo worked on his physics, or when
Shakespeare wrote Hamlet. These activities can be described
molecularly as processes whereby excitation on the sensory surface
of an animal is conducted by nerve ﬁbres to nerve centers, switched
over to efferent nerves, and resulting in muscle contraction or
gland secretion. Ordinary man, however, knows nothing of the
molecular processes of conscious experience, but he certainly
knowswhat it is like to experience a football game or a sunset by the
sea.
The East and West provide distinctive conceptions of this sub-
jective experience. Western medicine, for instance, tends to see the
mind and body as “split,” comprising two separate entities. Eastern
traditions, by contrast, suggest that mind and body derive from the
same energy (source). These conceptions of consciousness pose
more than philosophical issues, particularly because, in the West,
dualism between the mind and body has affected how patients are
perceived and treated.
The problem of consciousness has occupied the best human
minds for thousands of years, and has generated twomost common
ways of facing the hard problem of consciousness inwestern science,
the physicalist and the dualistic view.
1. Thewhole problem is illusory. This response holds that there are
not two kinds of substance or modes of existence, matter, and
mind, but only one, viz. matter. Matter is composed of blindly
whirling atoms that, owing to their great numbers and time
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call animals and human beings. Thus, it is scientiﬁc conviction
that thinking and feeling are merely movements of atoms, even
including the feeling of awe accompanying the moment of
remarkable scientiﬁc discoveries. This materialistic conception
of mind has served science well, building up physical and
physiological knowledge. Nevertheless, difﬁculty resides in the
fact that between life andmind this conception of consciousness
makes an arbitrary discrimination with regard to scientiﬁc
dignity. They have accepted matter and rejected mind, while
each of them may in fact disclose as much of the truth as the
other.
2. The second solution draws a Cartesian line between life and
inanimate nature belonging together. This response places mind
and life together as directed by a power not found in inorganic
nature, and therefore as essentially different from it. However,
this response does not solve but rather re-emphasizes the
problem. Numerous speculative attempts have been made to
overcome dualism. But pretending that a new name provides a
solution to it may do a great deal of harm to science were it to be
widely accepted.
Cartesian dualism is theoretically rejected in contemporary
science, although, as previously mentioned, in practice we see too
often a gap between the body and the mind inwestern science. The
procedure is either to look for the subjective phenomena in the
brain (bottom-up paradigm), or to theoretically reject the subjec-
tive phenomena while investigating brain function (top-down
paradigm). Science cannot empirically deny subjectivity as an
ontological phenomenon, nor can it verify or falsify subjective
phenomena.
Subjective phenomena have been identiﬁed as the hard problem
of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995). The hard problem concerns why
physical stimulation must be presented to consciousness with a
subjective feel. As David Chalmers frames problem (1995, p. 3).
It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis,
but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why
should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It
seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.
The subjective aspect of experience, elicited from sensory
stimulation, was illustrated by Frank Jackson (1982) in a thought
experiment known as “the knowledge argument” against physi-
calism. It can be summarized as follows. Mary is a neurophysiolo-
gist who happens to be color blind from birth, but nevertheless
specializes in perception and color. Imagine that she knows all
there is to know in physical terms about perception before she in
fact perceives red for the ﬁrst time. Would she know what it is like
to perceive red? Notwithstanding all the knowledge Mary has
about the neurophysiology of sightdhowever detailed it may
bedthis knowledge cannot give her the experience of what it feels
like to see a red rose. Jackson's thought experiment attempts to
establish, ﬁrst, that there are non-physical properties, and second
that knowledge of these properties can only be attained through
conscious experience. Thus, Jackson's thought experiment attempts
to refute the claim that all knowledge is physical knowledge. To the
contrary, conscious experience must involve non-physical proper-
ties because someone with complete physical knowledge about
some phenomenon might yet lack knowledge about how it feels to
experience the phenomenon itself. From this it follows that Mary
does not know what if feels like (Nagel, 1974) to see red until she in
fact sees red, sc. until she has had the conscious, phenomenal
experience of red.
Easy problems, on the other hand, are those that fall within
the scope of neuronal and cognitive function. These are usually
studied through statistical and computation measurements. Suchmeasuring techniques include behavioral models of yes/no re-
sponses (button-pushes, time-responses, etc.), and neuroimaging.
Cognitive functions, such as memory, attention, sensory stimula-
tion, are empirically investigated and explained by the standard
methods and tools of cognitive science, viz. by computational or
neural mechanisms (Chalmers, 1995, p. 2). On these models, to
explain access (to consciousness) and reportability (language), for
instance, we need only specify the mechanisms by which infor-
mation about internal states is retrieved and made available for
verbal report. To explain the integration of information, we need
only exhibit mechanisms by which information is brought together
and exploited by later processes. For an account of sleep and
wakefulness, for example, an appropriate neurophysiological ac-
count of the process responsible for an organism's contrasting
behavior in those states will sufﬁce. As Chalmers (1995, pp. 2e3)
explains:
In each case, an approximate cognitive or neurophysiological
model can clearly do the explanatory work […] If this phe-
nomena were all there was to consciousness, then conscious-
ness would not be much of a problem.
In cognitive science the hard problem of consciousness, or of
subjective phenomena, comes up again and again. Indeed, it is well-
known to those who study brain function, such as LeDoux, Antonio
Damasio, Gerhard Roth, and Francisco Varela. There are two
fundamental models to understanding the phenomenon of mind.
The ﬁrst is the computational model, based on symbolic thinking
paradigm; the second is the biological organism model, based on
the natural life paradigm. The latter involves the thought that we
should understand mind from the perspective of life and evolution.
In what follows, we will brieﬂy present and discuss two versions
proposed within the biological model.
1.2. Neurobiology of consciousness
In recent years, neuroscientists have intensively studied the
cerebral activity correlated with conscious experience. Patterns of
cell activity have been detected from PET and fMRI scans, which are
commonly seen as showing themind in action. It is said that we can
now see where mental arithmetic occurs, where words are formed,
where lies are generated, and even where our religious sentiments
are located (albeit what we are in fact witnessing are changes in
oxygen levels in the blood during these mental activities).
The embryonic neurobiology of consciousness was introduced
by Crick and Clark in their The Astonishing Hypothesis (1994), fol-
lowed by The Quest for Consciousness by Koch (2004), which further
lays down paths to be explored in the next several decades. Koch is
optimistic that careful scientiﬁc research will provide the answers,
but is less impressed with the theoretical limits imposed by phi-
losophers. Although Koch admits that philosophers have frequently
formulated questions that challenge scientists, philosophical con-
straints are often overlooked (Martinez-Conde, 2004). Their model
proposes a neurobiological account of experience. Koch narrows
down the neural correlates of consciousness for visual conscious-
ness to coalitions of neurons in and around the inferior temporal
cortex, projecting to the frontal lobes and supported by feedback
activity from the cingulate and frontal cortices. The function of
consciousness, he states, is to provide an “executive summary” of
theworld's status to the planning stages of the brain (i.e. the frontal
lobes). Thus, consciousness may be an intermediate-level process
(see Jackendoff's, 1987) limited to intermediate brain areas. This
view has been illustrated with the idea of a homunculus, sc. the
explanation of (human) vision by assuming there is an internal
‘viewer’, namely a ‘little man’ or ‘homunculus’ inside the brain
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Cartesian Theatre). The homunculus argument has, however, been
the target of criticism and is today generally seen as a fallacy.
Another source of difﬁculty regards how to metaphysically deﬁne,
and ontologically conceptualize, “visual consciousness”. In empir-
ical investigation, one should be cautious when establishing
metaphysical correlations of levels of reality. It seems the object of
Koch's study is ‘vision awareness’, that is, the relation between
attentional function and vision stimulation, which would fall
naturally within the purview of the easy problems. It has, however,
nothing to dowith how subjects experience a certain phenomenon.
In other words, it fails to explain the phenomenological experience
accompanying sensory stimulation.
Antonio Damasio proposes a theory about the neural basis of
consciousness that contests the idea of a homunculus inside the
brain (Damasio, 1994, 2010). On Damasio's view, consciousness is a
private, ﬁrst-personal phenomenon that can be studied by
combining cognitive and neurobiological methods in order to
describe its cognitive nature, behavioral correlates, possible
evolutionary origin, functional role, and ﬁnally its neuroanatomical
and neurophysiological underpinnings (Damasio, 1998). Phenom-
enal conscious content is, in Damasio's view, a matter of associa-
tions that are processed in different brain areas at the same time.
More speciﬁcally, what makes a conscious state feel like something
rather than nothing is explained as a fusion of mind and body, in
which neurons become “extensions of the ﬂesh.” Phenomenal
consciousness is enabled as the result of a procession of neural
maps of inner and outer worlds. Indeed, this is what Damasio
names self-consciousness. Without a self, the mind would lose its
orientation: thoughts would be freewheeling, unclaimed by an
owner, and we would almost certainly look unconscious (Damasio,
2010; chap. III).
Damasio makes a distinction between three levels of “self”,
which build upon each other to construct the kind of full-blown
consciousness that humans are privileged to experience. On his
view, the most basic form of selfdthe “protoself”dis a neural map
of an organism's internal status, i.e., related to primordial feelings
of the body present in the normal, waking brain (p. 191). The “core
self” is what further extends the “protoself”, namely by incorpo-
rating interactions between an organism and its environment. It
provides personhood, and ﬁrmer senses of being. At the highest
level, there is the “autobiographical self”, which adds information
about an organism's past and its expectations about the future.
With language as a useful medium, memory and reasoning are
enhanced. With this enhancement, narratives become possible,
giving the “core self” the sense of being a protagonist, that is, an
“autobiographical self”.
Damasio's theory is largely centered on the notion and levels of
self as exempliﬁed by the brain. His theory relies on neuroimaging
techniques and determines that experience results from internal or
external physical stimuli. This view therefore requires under-
standing experience on its reductive construal. Damasio (1994,
2010) rejects dualism by bringing consciousness back to the body
(sc. brain function). The reduction of experience to brain function
returns us squarely to a reductionist view of consciousness.
Damasio's theory is in opposition to other biological approaches,
such as the life-mind continuity thesis. According to the latter, no-
tions of both conscious phenomena and selﬂessness play an
essential role.
1.3. The life-mind continuity thesis
Avariety of phenomena in human experience reveal that, within
different evolutionary levels of living organisms, life and mind
cannot be thought of as two distinct phenomena. To the contrary,mind and life are two indispensable categories that, by virtue of
their internal relation and identical ontology, form a whole.
According to the mind-life continuity thesis there are three
levels (Godfrey-Smith, 1998). On the weak continuity view, what-
ever has mind will have life, although not all things that have life
have mind. Cognition is a kind of activity of a living system. On the
strong continuity view, life and mind have a common abstract
model or set of basic organizational properties. The functional
properties of mind are usually the indispensable properties of life.
On the methodology continuity view, the understanding of mind
requires further understanding the role that it plays in the whole
living system (pp. 72e73). Each of the views within the life-mind
continuity thesis share the perspective that cognition should be
studied in the context of “the whole organism” (Godfrey-Smith,
1998).
1.3.1. The enactive approach and autopoiesis
The life-mind continuity thesis is accommodated by enactive
cognitive science. This is the biological model that emerges from
the theory of autopoiesis. Autopoiesis aims to correlate the data from
brain, mind, and consciousness studies (particularly neuroscience
laboratory work), with phenomenological insights in the under-
standing and explanation of subjective experience, and ongoing
reﬂection on one's own personal consciousness, as conceived by
Buddhism (Varela et al., 1993; Varela, 1996, 1999; Hayward and
Varela, 1992).
Autopoiesis is a theory concerning the inextricable link between
life and cognition, insofar as one cannot exist without the other. As
Luisi and Houshmand (2010, pp. 85e86) elaborate:
[The] starting point is the interaction between the autopoietic
unit and the environment. The living unit is characterized by
biological autonomy and at the same time is strictly depen-
dent on the external medium for its survival. There appears to
be a contradiction here, and life must indeed operate within
this apparent contradiction. The interaction with this envi-
ronment is always a very speciﬁc one, in the sense that the
interaction a butterﬂy has with the environment is different
from the interaction a worm or a human being has with the
environment
In other words, the internal structure of the organism changes
and adapts according to its environment. The structure of the living
organism, together with its previous history of perturbations, de-
termines the reactions that new perturbations will induce.
Changes, mutations, and evolution are here seen as the result of
maintaining the internal structure of an autopoietic organism.
The term 'cognition' applies only to living entities, and not to the
inanimate world. From unicellular to multicellular organisms, from
plants to insects, ﬁsh and mammals, each one has its own type of
cognition corresponding to a different level of life's complexity.
Cognition, as seen here, contrasts with the representational/cog-
nitivist model. This is because it consists in a mutual interaction
between the inner structure of the system and the environment, in
the sense that the environment is ‘created’ during interaction itself
as, for example, when a spider creates a web. It is in this sense that
enaction is the process of mutual bringing into existence: the or-
ganismwith its sensorium ‘creates’ its ownworld; the environment
allowing the living organism to come into being.
According to this theory, the very notion of consciousness de-
rives from the autopoietic organization of life: there is no organic
human life without consciousness, and there is no consciousness
that is not embodied in organic life. This perspective culminated in
the neurophenomenological method (Varela, 1996), which is, ac-
cording to Varela (1997, in Rudrauf et al., 2003):
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cally reduce the distance between subjective and objective […] a
way of narrowing the gap between the mental and the physical
1.4. The free energy principle
There have been recent attempts to formalize the enactive
theory with brain physiology. This is known as the Free Energy
Principle (FEP). On some generous articulations of this view, free
energy minimization occurs not only in biological systems but also
takes place in nonliving systems, ranging from synchronization of
clocks, to the primordial soup and social networks. Although there
are some variants of this hypothesis, it generally holds that or-
ganisms act tomaintain themselves in their expected biological and
cognitive states, and that they can only do so by minimizing their
free energy, provided that the long-term average of free energy is
entropy (Kirchhoff and Froese, 2017).
A cognitivist view of the free energy principle, however, con-
ceives of the relationship between life and mind under the pre-
dictive mind hypothesis. This is a model associating minds with
computational processes requiring semantic (i.e. contentful)
properties, or allowing the possibility of the mind to be potentially
realized independently of life, were it to be given artiﬁcial support.
A non-cognitivist approach to the free energy principle (Friston,
2009, 2013), by contrast, implies that mentality is ubiquitous. This
is a strong continuity view on particular concepts of life (viz.
autopoiesis and adaptivity) and mind (basic and non-semantic). On
the non-cognitivist view:
All systems that maintain their variables within a limited range
of values can be understood as having some form ofmentality or
proto-mentality given that the FEP casts any system that is able
to maintain structural integrity in the face of a ﬂuctuating
environment as engaged in predicting its own future states. That
is, retaining integrity rests upon processes the function of which
is to maximize model evidencedi.e., these processes exhibit
self-evidencing dynamics (Kirchhoff and Froese, 2017, p. 18).
The enactive theory endorses the non-cognitivist view. Subjec-
tive phenomena should not be mistakenly understood as a
powerful generative brain model of semantic mental representa-
tions (cognitivist free energy principle), nor as an application of
processing neural maps used to ‘recover’ the structure of the
external world by conceptual reﬂection on the state of the external
environment (as argued by Damasio). On the enactive view, human
experience is conceived of as an internal structure of pre-reﬂective
dynamic interaction. Varela adopts the Buddhist notion of a virtual
selfdor a selﬂess selfdand reconceives it on biological level.
Enactivism, as informed by Buddhism, thereby assumes a unique
perspective.
1.5. Buddhist practice and meditation
The western idea of self is very different from the eastern
because the universe does not play an important or relevant role.
The self is seen as the enclosed capacity “to order my own thoughts
and my own life, to use reason as an instrument to control and
order my own life … what's really important is not the particular
content of our feelings or thinking but the power to control it
reﬂexively (Varela, 1997, p. 18).
Over the past two thousand years Buddhists have developed
sophisticated philosophical, phenomenological, and epistemolog-
ical notions of egolessness (or selﬂessness), which form the core of
Buddhist thought.The Dalai Lama then asked, “In the modern West, when one
thinks ‘I’ or ‘I am,’ does this necessarily imply that the ‘I’ so
conceived must be posited as being independent or autono-
mous?” Charles's answer was very Buddhist in ﬂavor. “If you ask
people, they say no. But in the way they actually live it, the
answer is yes, very powerfully, and much more so than our
ancestors who thought of themselves more as part of a larger
cosmos. (Varela, 1997, p. 20).
Buddhists refuted the existence of a permanent, unchanging
self. In general, all four philosophical schools within Buddhism
agree in denying the existence of a self that has a separate nature
from the psychological constituents. According to His Holiness the
Dalai Lama,
“There are four major schools of Buddhist philosophy, among
which we consider the PrasaṅgikaMadhyamaka school to be the
most profound. One school of thought identiﬁes the self
essentially with consciousness, whereas the Prasaṅgika school
regards the self as something imputed on the basis of the
collection of the aggregates, or the mind and body. The
Svatantrika Madhyamaka and all the lower Buddhist schools
regard the statement that phenomena exist merely as imputa-
tions, not by their own nature, as an expression of nihilism”
(Varela, 1997, p. 117).
The self is a ﬂow of our experience: feelings of sadness and so
forth arise in response to certain experiences,
“If in fact the self does not truly exist, then apprehending the self
as not being truly existent is, of course, in accord with reality…
For a person who has investigated whether or not the self is
truly existent, and through this investigation gains some actual
experience of the lack of true existence of a self, when for this
person a sense of self starts to arise more strongly it would not
arise with the sense of apprehending the self as truly existent.
Rather, the self would be apprehended without the qualiﬁcation
of being either truly existent or not truly existent. It could also
happen for such a person that, although the self appears as if it
were truly existent, one knows that it’s not. In this situation, the
self is apprehended as being like an illusion. It appears in one
fashion but one knows it doesn't exist according to that mode of
appearance. Hence it's like an illusion.” (His Holiness the Dalai
Lama, in Varela, 1997, pp. 117e118).
As a practice, Buddhism requires involvement in the same way
that scientists are involved in their work, or as a writer's mind is
involved in writing (see Brockman, 1996). To these contemplative
practices, the self is neither a thing nor an entity, but a process.
According to Evan Thompson (2014), the sort of focused atten-
tion practicesdas developed by some Buddhist traditionsdcan be
construed as techniques for attending to features of experience that
we ordinarily ignore or neglect. In other words, adept meditators
can see and notice things that we rarely ever do. Thus, Buddhist
contemplative practices can be understood as a kind of phenome-
nological training that can serve the scientiﬁc study of mind.
In Buddhism, mental training is often described as a systematic
process of familiarizing oneself with the present character of
mental events. This training cultivates a capacity for sustained,
attentive awareness of the moment-to-moment ﬂux of experience
(Thompson, 2006). This seems to tell against a reﬂective account of
the self, because concepts do not always do justice to the full range
of qualities we experience. In the Western tradition, we tend to
think that consciousness is something that is either present or
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knocked out. In the East, however, it is essential to distinguish
modes of consciousness within the range of, what we in the West
call, unconsciousness. Dreaming, lucid dreaming, deep and
dreamless sleep, and so-called 'pure awareness' are examples of
such modes. Indian philosophy's (see Kak, 1997) major aim is pre-
cisely the development of a taxonomy of modes of human con-
sciousness (Thompson, 2014).
Western science, however, has not yet furnished for itself an
adequate phenomenology of conscious experience. As such, it is
essential that we open the channels for constructive dialogue with
the Eastern tradition and its practitioners, thereby enabling their
insights to inform our own investigations, and vice versa.
2. The empirical study
Here, we focus on the qualitative study, in which we used a
Buddhist meditative practice as our intervention protocol. Buddhist
mediation was chosen (instead of other possible kinds) in virtue of
the autopoietic paradigm. We hope we were able to show, in the
theoretical background, why the autopoietic paradigm, inspired in
the Buddhist conception of the mind, is stronger in providing non-
reductive explanation of subjective experience. Because subjective
experience cannot be reduced to brain pictures and/or yes/no an-
swers, this paradigm takes into consideration the rich ﬁrst-person
experience, in the attempt to combine it with third-person, quan-
titative, measurements.
In this experiment, we had two different groups: one attending a
regular class, and another practicing a demanding attentional task, a
guided meditation. Both groups were subsequently asked to quali-
tatively evaluate their experience through a psychological assess-
ment. This psychological assessment covered: 1) altered states; 2)
happiness awareness; 3) open awareness to the present; and 4)
private-public consciousness. This allowed us, ﬁrst, to compare
control groups to experimental groups, and, second, to probe the
experience with regard to its psychological characteristics.
3. Materials and methods
3.1. Materials
The materials comprised an intervention with a meditative
practice, and four qualitative tests using the following psychologi-
cal scales:
 Abnorme Psychischer Zustaende States of Consciousness (APZ)
(Dittrich, 1998) was used to assess the qualitative properties of
what is usually called an ‘altered state’. The items in the scale
aim to evidence: modiﬁcations of thought; intense emotional
response; bodily schema changes; perceptual changes; synaes-
thesia; and meaning alterations, which are typically evoked
during meditative practices.
 Subjective Happiness Scale (Lyubomirsky and Lepper, 1999) was
used to assess global subjective experience. Two items evalu-
ated absolute and relative personal experience; two others
items evaluated absolute and relative external experience. SHS
measures the construct of subjective happiness and well-being.
This scale aims to assess, therefore, the self- and non-self
perception experiences of happiness.
 Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS) (Brown and Ryan,
2003) was used to assess open awareness to the present.
MAAS taps a unique quality of consciousness related to, and
predictive of, pre-reﬂective self-experience.
 Self-consciousness Scale e Revised version (SCS-R) (Scheier and
Carver, 1985) was used to assess private-public self-consciousness, considered as sustained consciousness that is
relatively stable over time.
The contents and constructs evaluated by each scale are sum-
marized in Table 2. An example of the questions posed to the par-
ticipants is given for each self-report measure. For instance, in the
APZ scale, the main construct evaluated was self-boundaries al-
terations, composed of 23 binary items. An example of a variable
assessed was: “Sounds and noises seemed different fromwhat they
usually are.”. For the SHS scale, the main construct evaluated was
that of self and non-self experiences of happiness, composed of six
items on a [0; 7] scaling. An example of a variable assessed was:
“Some people are generally very happy. They enjoy life regardless of
what is going on, getting themost out of everything. Towhat extent
does this characterization describe you?”. Moreover, for the MAAS
scale, the main construct evaluated was open-awareness experi-
ences, composed of 15 items on a [1; 6] scaling. An example of a
variable assessed was: “I ﬁnd it difﬁcult to stay focused on what's
happening in the present.”. Finally, for the SCS-R scale, the main
construct evaluated was private and public self-consciousness,
composed of 23 items on ﬁve-point Likert scale. An example of a
variable assessed was: “I often daydream about myself.”.
3.2. Intervention protocol: meditative practice
It is well-established that a variety of mind-body techniques,
including yoga, mental imagery, hypnosis, biofeedback, and medi-
tation, are effective at addressing symptoms such as pain, anxiety,
nausea, and insomnia. These techniques also help with a variety of
medical, emotional, and behavioral issues (Culbert, 2017).
Meditative practice has been shown to play a physiological role
in inducing neuroplastic changes in amygdala activity (Leung et al.,
2017), as well as preventing age-related changes in cognitive
functioning (Cotieret al., 2017). Meditative practice has been
revealed as an effective alternative to pharmacology on blood
pressure response (Park and Han, 2017), and as a successful
cognitive behavioral therapy for epilepsy (Leeman-Markowski and
Schachter, 2016). In addition, meditation intervention appears to
promote a change in attentional focus from the internal to the
present-moment external world, thereby having important impli-
cations for the treatment of anxiety (Xu et al., 2017), and general-
ized anxiety disorders (Hoge et al., 2017).
3.2.1. Jhana meditation
The Pali word Jhana (Sanskrit ‘dhyana’) is often translated as
‘meditation’, but more accurately refers to ‘absorption’ into a
focused and stable state of concentration. In the classical tradition
there are several stages of Jhana, each one more focused than the
previous (Khema et al., 2001).
Traditional meditation is nowadays amenable to greater scientiﬁc
understanding. For example, meditation has the short-term goal of
stimulating the reward dopaminergic system. If the reward is greater
than expected, dopaminergic neurons in the Ventral Tegmental Area
(VTA) in the brain stem are activated. The VTA in turn innervates the
nucleus accumbens (NAc) in the ventral striatum, which leads to
higher centers in the orbital frontal cortex (OFC). Human studies
have shown that activity in the medial OFC at the time of a reward
correlates with subjective reports (Hagerty et al., 2013). According to
Hagerty et al. (2013), Jhanameditation has also been associated with
speciﬁc brain correlates, which may characterize the subjective
experience of classical Jhana meditation: (1) external awareness
diminishing; (2) internal verbalizations fading; (3) self-boundaries
alteration; (4) increase of focused attention; and (5) well-being.
The brain correlates, obtained by fMRI (BOLD signal) and qEEG
(bands power), consisted in: (1) decreased activation compared to
Table 1
Descriptive analysis.
Descriptive Analysis Instrument Biometric Data Abnormer Psychischer
Zustand Scale
Subjectiove
Happiness Scale
Mindful Attention
Awarness Scale
Self-Consciousness
Scale (Total)
Self-Consciousness
Scale (Private)
Self-Consciousness
Scale (Public)
N Variable Age BMI
Total 92 Mean 21,67 21,6627 21,79% 79,43% 66,45% 69,33% 71,38% 77,69%
Median 21,36 21,0937 17,39% 78,57% 65,56% 69,70% 74,07% 76,19%
SD 1538 2,68483 25,10% 8,64% 10,12% 25,10% 25,10% 25,10%
Minimum 19 17,57 0,00% 54,00% 46,00% 26,00% 19,00% 24,00%
Maximum 26 32,64 70,00% 100,00% 94,00% 89,00% 100,00% 100,00%
P25 20,46 19,8177 4,35% 75,00% 59,17% 60,98% 62,96% 66,67%
P50 21,36 21,0937 17,39% 78,57% 65,56% 69,70% 74,07% 76,19%
P75 22,53% 23,0518% 34,78% 85,71% 73,33% 75,76% 81,48% 90,48%
Table 2
Self-report measurement.
Subjective Experience Assesment
Scale Constructs N. Items Scaling Variables (items) example
APZ Self-boundaries alteration 23 binary “Sounds and noises seemed different from what they usually are.”
“Time passed faster than usually.”
“My body seemed bigger/longer than before.”
SHS Self and non-self experiences
of happiness
4 [0; 7] “Some people are generally very happy. They enjoy life regardless of what is going on, getting the
most out of
everything. To what extent does this characterization describe you?”
“Some people are generally not very happy. Although they are not depressed, they never seem as
happy as they
might be. To what extent does this characterization describe you?”
MAAS Open-awareness experiences 15 [1; 6] “I ﬁnd it difﬁcult to stay focused on what's happening in the present.”
“I get so focused on the goal I want to achieve that I lose touch with what I'm doing right
now to get there.”
“I tend not to notice feelings of physical tension or discomfort until they really grab my attention.”
SCS-R Private & public
Self-consciousness
23 ﬁve-point
Likert scale
“I generally pay attention to my inner feelings.”
“I often daydream about myself.”
“I know the way my mind works when I work through a problem.”
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processing areas; (2) decreased activation compared to the rest state
in Broca's area (BA 44,45) and in Wernicke's area (BA 39,40); (3)
decreased activation compared to the rest state in the orientation
area (BA5); (4) increased activation compared to the rest state in the
Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) (BA 32,33); and (5) increased acti-
vation compared to the rest state in the dopamine reward system of
the brain (NAc in the ventral striatum and medial OFC). Reciprocal
connections between the NAc and the medial OFC were found
(D'ardenne et al., 2008). The authors suggest the possibility of acti-
vating a feedback loop between the two (Hagerty et al., 2013).
In this study, Jhana meditative practice was adopted in the
experimental group to promote this possible feedback loop, by
switching attentional focus to the conscious experience present in
the different stages of this type of meditation.
3.3. Study design
This is a randomized, controlled, multicentered and single
blinded study. The study, approved by the ethics committee of the
Faculty of Medicine, University of Lisbon, was carried out in LIMMIT
Lab at the same university as the centralizing research unit, and in
collaboration with SalivaTec (Molecular Cognition(G)), Institute of
Health Sciences (ICS), Center for Interdisciplinary Research in
Health (CIIS), Universidade Catolica Portuguesa, Viseu, Portugal,
and the Mind-Brain Doctoral College, University of Lisbon.
The study consisted of two groups: a control group attending a
regular class, and the intervention group practicing a guided
meditation that aimed to promote conscious experience. After this
practice, all the participants (control and intervention) were asked
to qualitatively evaluate (posttest design) the experience in relationto: 1) altered states; 2) happiness awareness; 3) open awareness to
the present; and 4) private-public self-consciousness. Participants
were asked to conduct this qualitative evaluation using the four
psychological scales outlined above.
3.3.1. Sampling and population of the study
For this study, students from the University of Lisbon (Faculty of
Medicine, Faculty of Economy, Faculty of Sciences, and The School
of Social and Political Sciences) were recruited. A convenience
sample of 128 healthy volunteers, students at the University of
Lisbon, non-meditators, were recruited and screened by the in-
clusion criteria, in order to achieve a proportion of 50% men. Sub-
jects received information and gave informed consent as they
enrolled in the study.
3.3.1.1. Sample screening and group characterization. Screening was
conducted through a general questionnaire, concerning the
following (a) inclusion criteria: 1) 19-25-year-old young adults;
male/female; 2) cultural background: university students; 3)
normal body mass index (BMI), and 4) non-medicated excepting
birth control pills; and (b) exclusion criteria: 1) serious physical
illness or uncontrolled disorders of kidney liver, lung, heart,
musculoskeletal, rheumatologic, metabolic, neurological or psy-
chiatric; 2) severe chronic or terminal disease, which might affect
the CNS or PNS; 3) pregnant or breastfeeding women; 4) abuse of
alcohol or addictive substances, prior to the experience.
The allocation was randomized and parallel assigned, based on
the students that were attending different lectures. Both experi-
mental and control arm, with a 1:1 allocation, was conserved. The
blinding was maintained in the interventions protocol and partially
in the assessment protocol.
Fig. 1. Stratiﬁcation of the four groups.
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We used the following software for (i) statistical and data
management: IBM SPSS Statistics 22e signiﬁcance level ¼ 5%; and
(ii) laboratory information management: LabWare™ LIMS.
3.4.1. Descriptive and exploratory analysis
Frequency tables (simple/double entries) were used. Scale var-
iables were summarized as mean, standard deviation, median,
quartiles, minimum,maximum and/or others order statistics, when
the sample distribution justiﬁed it. Categorical variables were
summarized using frequency and percentage. When the scale of
measure was ordinal, order statistics were considered, e.g. tercile.
Boxplots were used as a graphic exploratory tool. Moreover,
Spearman's rank correlation coefﬁcient was applied.
3.5. Sample size study
The full sample size study is supported by the previous pre-
liminary results of the experimental group [Martins et al., 2016],
and, bearing in mind that the main objective was to test the
research hypothesis that led to full study (i.e. the evidence that
there is a signiﬁcant change in the proteome proﬁle in the sub-
phenomes characterized in this paper), the following approach was
designed. It was, for that purpose, considered a potency (T-Student)
of 80%, a signiﬁcance level of 5%, and an effect size corresponding to
40% of the estimated value for the standard deviation of the vari-
ation of the molecular weights in the preliminary study, executed
before proposing this qualitative evaluation. Taking into account
this option, that corresponds to a medium Cohen's effect size, an
appropriate sample size for each group (experimental and control)
of 64 elements was found.
3.6. Results and discussion
Through a guided meditation subjects were led to evoke a
conscious experience, and later asked to evaluate the experience.
We tested the qualitative relation between this experience and 1)
altered states; 2) happiness awareness; 3) open awareness to the
present; and 4) private-public self-consciousness.
The sample was separated into independent groups: (a) exper-
imental group (64 subjects), and (b) control group (sham inter-
vention) (64 subjects). Then, these groups were stratiﬁed by the
subjective assessments protocol into Top and Bottom Phenomes, by
a statistical strategy, which will further inform the interpretation of
a pre-molecular clinical stratiﬁcation.3 This ﬁrst clinical subtyping
permitted a stratiﬁcation resulting in four groups: (i) the Top
Experimental Phenome; (ii) the Top Control Phenome; (iii) the
Bottom Experimental Phenome and (iv) the Bottom Control Phe-
nome, as shown in Fig. 1.
The four subphenomes (groups) were tested for comparability
statistics and external biometric data, possibly confounding vari-
ables, and were considered comparable for age, gender and BMI.
The qualitative study allowed us not only to characterize the sub-
jective experience of the whole sample (Table 1), but also to look at
the differences between the performances of the experimental
group in the meditative practice versus the control group attending
a class.
As displayed in Fig. 2, there is a clear distinction between the
experimental and control groups. The qualitative performance of
the psychological task (four scales) allowed us to identify four
groups: (1) top experimental group (the higher tercile) constituting3 Forthcoming by the authors and collaborators.the sample of the best performances during the intervention; (2)
the top control group (the higher tercile) indicating the best sub-
jects to focus during the class; (3) the bottom experimental group
(the lower tercile) constituting the group of subjects that per-
formed lower (lack of focus) during the intervention; (4) the bot-
tom control group (lower tercile) constituting the group that
performed lower (lack of focus) during the class.
Figure 3 presents the comparative results of the phenomeno-
logical descriptions of each of the four subgroups. As illustrated in
Fig. 2, the four subgroups performed differently on the overall
scores of self-report measures. This suggests speciﬁc constructions
of subjective experience, which resulted in the four subgroups: 1)
top experimental group; (2) top control group; (3) bottom experi-
mental group; and (4) bottom control group. These speciﬁc psy-
chological characteristics can further be correlated to a speciﬁc
molecular expression. In Fig. 3, as a proof of concept, we describe
the same variables as in Table 2. These variables, or questions posed
to the participants in the qualitative assessment, are dissected
discretely and ubiquitously for all items of the self-report measures.
For instance, in the APZ scale the (1) top experimental group (0.60)
reported that “Sounds and noises seemed different fromwhat they
usually are”; while (2), the top control group, and (3), the bottom
experimental group, did not report this (0.91); while (4), the bot-
tom control group, did not consider the question at all (0).
On the SHS scale, the (1) top experimental group appeared
frequently against the statement: “Some people are generally very
happy. They enjoy life regardless of what is going on, getting the
most out of everything. To what extent does this characterization
describe you?”. This was less true of (2), the top control group; even
less so of (3), the bottom experimental group; and only moderately
true of (4), the bottom control group.
On the MAAS scale, (1), the top experimental group, somewhat
infrequently ” … found it difﬁcult to stay focused on what's
happening in the present”, while for (2), the top control group, this
was almost never reported; for (3), the bottom experimental group,
somewhat frequently reported; and for (4), the bottom control
group, this was infrequently reported.
On the SCS-R scale, (1), the top experimental group, report that
“daydreaming about themselves” pertains greatly to them; while
(2), the top control group, report that the statement pertains only a
little to them; (3), the bottom experimental group, report that the
statement somewhat pertains to them; and (4), the bottom control
group, reported that the statement does not pertain to them at all.
The intervention with a guided meditation and the qualitative
assessment with the four psychological scales, allowed us to:
Fig. 2. Qualitative performance control vs. experimental groups.
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Fig. 3. Comparative results of the phenomenological reports.
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tions of their own conscious experience, and
(2) Clinically and phenomenologically understand the groups,
and their subtypes, to motivate the investigation of protein
correspondence (i.e., quantifying the differences in their
proteomic proﬁles).
The model presented here bears resemblance to the neuro-
phenomenological method, which proposes to introduce into brain
research on subjectivity and consciousness ﬁrst-personal methods
of examining experience. Our method, however, constitutes a
variation insofar as the quantitative part of the study does
not consist in a brain-centered methodology. Another point ofdifference regards the qualitative evaluation: our participants are
not trained in the phenomenological method, that is, they complete
the intervention naively. Our quantitative method instead consists
in a functional protein proﬁle (proteomics), that is, dynamic protein
information that is distributed along the organism itself.
The aim of this study is the understanding of molecular in-
teractions induced by an intervention protocol. We focus on the
whole: the proteome, referring to the entire set of proteins pro-
duced or modiﬁed by an organism or system. Commonly, there are
two biochemical methodologies used to study a biological system:
a) directed studies (classical biochemical studies), and b) enlarged
studies (the omics biochemical studies). This work is not intended
as a directed analysis into a speciﬁc or exact candidate neural
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necessary to conduct such a study is virtually impossible. Rather,
we propose a study with a different magnitude, i.e. an enlarged,
non-directed perspective, or an omics study. We intend to probe
physical interactions between molecules, as an example of “top-
down” systems biology, taking an overheaddas well as overalld
view of a biosystem (Bruggeman andWesterhoff, 2007; Kiemer and
Cesareni, 2007). The work is proposed as a systems biology para-
digm, usually deﬁned by contrast to a reductionist biological or-
ganization. As Denis (2006) notes, “Systems biology […] is about
putting together rather than taking apart”. As a method, omics
comprises high-throughput analytic techniques (Romualdi et al.,
2009). These techniques include, for example, transcriptomics,
metabolomics or proteomics, to propose speciﬁc testable hypoth-
eses (Alberghina and Westerhoff, 2005); for instance, the result of
an experimental induction. Normally, the output of an omics study
is a multi-database generation (Baitaluk, 2009). Speciﬁcally, in
future publications, it will be generated layered results of total
proteins proﬁles, simultaneous immunedetections and quantiﬁca-
tions and in-silico characterization, using bioinformatics tools, like
cytoscape® and panther®. Top-down systems biology like these
could in principle identify molecular interaction networks
(Bruggeman et al., 2007). Although there are still today explanatory
limitations, the interaction between molecular networks can be
correlated to observed behavior of subjective experience, evaluated
through self-report measures. Explanatory limitations include, for
instance, the incapability of connecting a speciﬁc neural pathway to
a speciﬁc self-reported behavior. Indeed, such an explanatory error
resides in the inability to rule out preliminary reasoning, suggesting
that such behavioral-molecular correlations were present in the
ﬁrst place.
Subjective experience has been studied as the macroscopic
cartography of synaptic connections in a macro-network, but could
also be probed on an intra-cellular scale: a micro-network. Those
neural networks are regulated upwards or downwards via intra-
cellular regulatory networks of the transcriptome interfaces
(Foster, 2015). Insufﬁcient ﬁndings describe speciﬁc molecular
networks that can be elicited through inducting a speciﬁc subjec-
tive experience. This scientiﬁc gap motivates setting up an omics
approach. The object of this study is the interplay between mind,
body, environment and behavioral characteristics. In speciﬁc, this
study concerns how subjective experience modulates objective
biological measurements (Ulvestad, 2012). Omics methodologies
have been recently gathering a complex and extensive quantity of
data enabling biomedical sciences to assimilate and deﬁne a sys-
tems biology framework. Methodologies such as the one proposed
by Ritchie and colleagues (2015), assesses biological systems via
multi-omics, i.e., from transcriptome to phenome. Omics studies
began to characterize different biological substrates. Nevertheless,
such studies have only recently looked into neuronal structures
(English et al., 2012), giving access to solid neuroproteomics data-
bases (Collins et al., 2006; Behan et al., 2009; Hahn et al., 2009; Ishii
et al., 2009; Bayes et al., 2011). We propose that omics studies
advance towards insights into the biomolecular underpinnings of
subjective experience, for instance, the physiological mechanisms
involved in strong emotional states (Chiappelli et al., 2006). Such an
advancement in omics studies would offer a neuroscientiﬁc
approach to the hard problem of consciousness (Susan et al., 2005).
Nevertheless, no publication yet has used analytical proteomic
techniques to evaluate physiological states resulting from the
expression of self-conscious experience (Martins et al., 2016).
Indeed, the difﬁculty surrounding such research consists in the fact
that self-conscious experience varies both with time, and with the
amount of environmental stress that an organism undergoes.4. Conclusion
It is a standard of modern Western scientiﬁc physiology to study
natural life by quantifying and measuring the correlation between
behavior and brain function. On our model, however, we focused on
the qualitative experience of a meditative state, centering our
method within a fruitful and mutually informative dialogue be-
tween Western objective (reproducible) experiments, and Eastern
subjective analysis. What makes our research innovative is its
starting-point in qualitative assessment, which subsequently directs
the interpretation of quantitative measurements of proteomics.
We found substantial differences between the control and the
experimental group, allowing us to conclude that the experimental
group was able to identify, describe, and report a subjective expe-
rience intrinsic to Jhana meditation. The intervention with Jhana
meditation and the qualitative assessment, implementing the four
psychological scales, allowed us to: (1) distinguish experiential
proﬁles based on the subjects’ evaluations of their own conscious
experience; and (2) deﬁne a clinical subtyping strategy. We iden-
tiﬁed, in the experimental group, two sub-groups: the higher and
the lower tercile. In the control group, we also found two sub-
groups: the higher and the lower tercile. These four tercile groups
will be further compared with the protein variations.
The study focused on the ﬁrst-person experience associated
with cognitive and mental events. Cognitive processes appear
relevant and manifested for the subject that can provide an ac-
count. We explored the ﬁrst-person account because the familiarity
we have with subjective life must give way in favour of the careful
examination of what it is that we can and cannot have access to,
and how this distinction is not rigid but variable. This ﬁrst-person
methodology appears as crucial because without a sustained ex-
amination we actually do not produce phenomenal descriptions
that are rich and subtly interconnected enough in comparisonwith
third-person accounts, that is, quantitative measurements (Shear
and Varela, 1999). To our knowledge, Jhana meditation has not
yet been studied on a ﬁrst-person account. We aim in the future to
complement this study with synamic protein information (prote-
omics). This physiological approach, measured by changes in
functional protein networks, might prove to be a promising
framework for objective, enactive research design. “Enaction”, as
conceived by Thompson and Stapleton (2009), grounds subjective
experience in macro-micro network interactions. A follow-up
study, to include molecular descriptions, will supplement the
psychological analysis of subjective phenomena as presented here.
Namely, the acquisition of multi-omics data of the subjective
experience of jhana meditation. The ﬁrst-person account charac-
terizes and stratiﬁes the sample into 4 distinct groups, by multiple
comparisons of the psychological scales variables, with a good in-
ternal consistency and reliability. Afterwards, the expected total
protein proﬁle (t0) of the 4 groups/subphenomes, characterized by
capillary electrophoresis, should be discrete. Then, the total protein
proﬁle difference (t1-t0) of the 4 groups/subphenomes should
show a constant variability in speciﬁc proteomic bands, e.g. in-
ﬂammatorymolecular weight range [17 kDa-33 kDa], characterized
by capillary electrophoresis. Henceforward, in silico analysis, cyto-
scapeTM and pantherTM, will generate functional protein net-
works, of the different 4 groups of the precise biological processes,
e.g. inﬂammation, of the neuronal-oral database created with
Uniprot® referencing. After accomplishing this tasks, a simulta-
neous immunedetection multiplexed analysis of the Th17 cytokine
and neuropeptides, e.g. substance-p, oxytocin, panel separates and
quantiﬁes the neuroinﬂammatory and neuropeptide molecular
response of the 4 distinct groups, and the individual neurophysi-
ological response. Finnaly, a graphical user interface toolbox will
I. Hipolito, J. Martins / Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology 131 (2017) 432e444 443provide exploration, visualization and integration of the different
datasets, with several datamining algorithms e.g. expectation-
maximization and principal component analysis.
In our study, we adopted a methodology that can provide an
open link to objective, empirically based description. The overall
results of the qualitative, ﬁrst-person, study should move towards
an integrated or global perspective on mind where neither expe-
rience nor external mechanisms have the ﬁnal word (Shear and
Varela, 1999). The mind-life perspective requires a reciprocal in-
ﬂuence and determination of ﬁrst- and third-person accounts. In
this paper, we studied phenomenal data as a crucial fact for the
domain of living beings, which, we expect, can provide the ground
for a subsequent third-person study.
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